However, within months, a pragmatic alliance between German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni BUILDS.

And yet politicians, in many ways, unlikely partnersthe union is quietly changing the balance of power in Europe. In the latest demonstration of this dynamic, a joint policy paper outlined by Merz and Meloni is scheduled to be delivered of European Union partners at an informal summit on February 12, 2026, urging reforms to improve the bloc’s competitiveness.

As a scholar of European politics, history and cultureI see that the union was born out of necessity but nevertheless serves the interests of both parties – and possibly the European Union, too.

Transfer from ‘Merkron’

Post-war European politics had seen the center of gravity move before, but much of it revolved around transfers to and from France or Germany, the current two largest economies in the bloc. The UK’s ability to dominate EU politics has always been constrained by this delay in the “European project” and ambivalence at home. And it ends immediately with a referendum in 2016 which saw the UK exit from the union.

For nearly a decade after Britain’s exit, Europe revolved around the axis of Angela Merkel in Germany and Emmanuel Macron in France, an alliance nicknamed “Merkron“: Merkel’s witty charm and cautious pragmatism are matched by Macron’s charisma and oozing European idealism. Their dual stewardship has helped guide the EU through Brexit, Donald Trump’s first presidency and the pandemic.

But times have changed.

Merkel is gone. He resigned as German chancellor in December 2021. On the other hand, Macron struggled with politics at home and more similar to what diplomats and journalists are be described as a European “Cassandra”: right in his warnings about global instability, but not doing much to mobilize support within the country or across the continent to deal with the issues.

The end of the “Merkron” era coincided with several crises facing Europe, including Russia. ongoing war in Ukrainecurrent unpredictability in the US, increasing climate pressures, relentless migration tensions and the collapse of arms control regimes.

The comforting post-Cold War assumption that the peace of Europe is permanent it’s gone.

An unlikely partnership

Into this void stepped Merz and Meloni. At first glance, the pairing looks strange.

Merz is an Atlantic conservative and an unapologetic economic liberal. His message, and the title of his 2008 book, “Dare More Capitalism“signaling a move towards an assertive pro-market agenda after years of cautious centrism under Merkel. Merz insisted Germany must rebuild its military capacity – a departure from decades of German domestic and EU-wide denial of such a move.

Meloni, on the other hand, rose to power from The nationalist right in Italy. The lineage of his house party, Fratelli d’Italia, or Brothers of Italy, traced back to the back of Mussolini’s fascists. Despite being in office, he proved to be politically astute, recasting himself as a responsible and successful actor in Europe. Meloni as prime minister continued support for Ukraine and cooperation with the European Union – dismissing concerns in both areas before he came to power. He has the same skill that is developing steadily relations with Washington – including Trump’s political campand generally appear successful strategic chameleonism.

Critics call him opportunists; admirers call him pragmatical. In any case, Meloni has mastered changing the shape of politics, becoming a bridge between nationalist and mainstream Europe.

What unites Merz and Meloni is less ideological than necessary.

Germany remains Europe’s economic engine but needs partners to push Europe towards greater defense capacity and economic competitiveness. Italy seeks greater influence and credibility in the core of Europe.

Both governments now speak the language of strategic autonomy: Europe must be able to defend itself and protect its interests although the US may be unreliable. As the joint paper was reportedly presented by other EU partners placed it: “Continuing on the current path is not an option. Europe must act now.”

Europe unites against a frenemy

Ironically, European unity often emerges in response to crisis.

Brexit strengthened pro-EU sentiment on the mainland. Similarly, Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine revived NATO and EU cooperation.

Now, Trump – as he flirts with abandoning NATO commitments, threatens tariffs and questioning of territorial arrangements in places like Greenland – caused a shock to the political consciousness of Europe.

Recent surveys show heavy support in Europe for stronger EU defense cooperation and greater unity against global threats.

For leaders like Merz and Meloni, it creates political space for policies that would have seemed unthinkable, or more difficult, a decade ago, such as military buildup, defense integration, industrial protection and tougher immigration policies.

Defense and militarization

The most dramatic change, perhaps, took place in Germany. For decades, Berlin shunned military leadershiptroubled by its history and hidden under US security guarantees. That time is coming to an end. German officers mostly talking about rearmamentEuropean defense readiness and long-term strategic competition.

The time could not be more urgent. Merz, framing Moscow’s ongoing aggression as a direct attack on European security and unity, declared in September 2025 that “we are not at war, but we are not at peace anymore.”

The new German-Italian plan of action clearly strengthens the cooperation in defense, cybersecurity and strategic industries. Both governments emphasized loyalty to NATO while simultaneously pushing for a stronger European military capacity.

The idea of ​​a future European defense force, once dismissed as fantasy, is now seriously circulating in policy circles. Rome is reportedly planning a major procurement deal with German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall worth up to US$24 billion (20 billion euros). Including hundreds of armored vehicles and new generation tanks, it will represent one of the largest joint defense projects in Europe.

The move reflects a shared push by Berlin and Rome to strengthen Europe’s military capacity while anchoring rearmament in European industrial partnerships.

What’s in it for Meloni and Merz?

For Meloni, the partnership with Berlin provides legitimacy. Italy has a traditional oscillated between European leadership and peripheral frustration. By aligning with Germany, Rome reentered the center of European decision-making.

At the same time, Meloni could present himself as a nationalist at home and indispensable to Europe. His political positions have allowed him to stay in Washington’s trenches while staying within the EU consensus – a balancing act that few European leaders can manage.

Germany, on the other hand, gets political flexibility and a partner more aligned with the EU’s big political picture.

said Macron ambitious federalist view sometimes alienating more cautious block mates. Italy offers a pragmatic counterweight for Merz, focused on competitiveness, migration control and industrial policy rather than a grand European redesign.

Macron is not completely squeezed. France anyway lead to nuclear deterrence and many diplomatic initiatives. But the political momentum is changing and now lies with governments willing to prioritize economic competitiveness and security over institutional reform.

Will it work?

The Merzoni partnership is facing big tests.

The Italian economy remains vulnerableand Germany’s export model is struggling amid changes in the global economy. Far-right and populist movements EU cohesion is still a challenge. And defense integration remains politically sensitive among member countries.

Yet necessity has always driven European integration. And as crises accumulate, cooperation becomes less optional.

The real question is whether Europe can move from reactive crisis management to having a proactive geopolitical strategy. For now, the unlikely German-Italian partnership suggests that the political map of Europe is being redrawn – not through grand federal visions but through pragmatic alliances shaped by fear, necessity and opportunity.

Julia Khrebtan-HörhagerAssociate Professor of Critical Cultural & International Studies, Colorado State University

This article was reprinted from The Conversation under Creative Commons license. Read the original article.