The first round of talks between Iran and the United States in Muscat produced no breakthrough. The next few weeks will determine whether they lay the foundation or just buy time before upgrading.

When Iranian and U.S. negotiators publicly concluded hours of talks in Muscat on February 6, neither side indicated it would change its open stance. Iran insisted the discussions focused solely on the nuclear document. The United States seeks a comprehensive framework that also covers ballistic missiles, regional armed groups, and broader issues that Washington has raised publicly, including human rights. Neither prevailed. Both parties agreed to meet again.

On the surface, this doesn’t seem like a big deal. This is not the case.

The Muscat round is the first high-level diplomatic contact between the two countries since a joint U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June 2025, an escalation that Iran later said killed more than 1,000 people and involved attacks on three nuclear facilities. It is significant that both sides have returned to the same palace near Muscat Airport where previous rounds of matches were held in 2025 and have agreed to return again.

But continuation does not mean progress. There remains a huge gap between what happens in Muscat and what is needed to reach a deal.

Diplomacy under military escort

The most striking feature of the Muscat Round was not what was said, but who sat in the room. The U.S. delegation is led by special envoy Steve Witkoff and President Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, appeared in full uniform for the first time.

His presence at the negotiating table was no accident. This is a signal. As the talks unfolded, the USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier strike group was operating in the Arabian Sea, days after the U.S. military shot down an Iranian drone that approached the aircraft carrier.

An Iranian diplomatic source told Reuters that Cooper’s presence “jeopardized” the talks. Al-Arabiya quoted another person as saying that “negotiations under threat” could increase strategic costs rather than increase them. For Tehran, the message is clear: This is diplomacy conducted in the shadow of force, not as an alternative to force.

Washington sees this as a bargaining chip. President Trump, speaking aboard Air Force One after the talks, called them “very good” and said Iran was “very eager” to make a deal, adding: “They know the consequences if they don’t make a deal. They don’t make a deal; the consequences are very serious.”

This is diplomacy as an ultimatum. It may create a sense of urgency. It is unlikely to build trust, which is what this process most desperately needs.

structural issues

The United States withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, despite international verification that Iran was meeting its obligations. The decision shattered Iran’s confidence in the durability of U.S. commitment. Tehran subsequently violated the agreement, steadily increasing enrichment levels starting in 2019, undermining its credibility.

This mutual distrust is not an obstacle to negotiations that can be resolved by creative diplomacy alone. This is a decisive condition for any agreement to be reached. The United States has the ability to impose huge economic and military costs on Iran. But power does not automatically produce obedience. To fulfill its commitments, Iran must believe concessions will bring relief, not new demands. This belief has been severely undermined.

Consider the series of events surrounding the Muscat Round itself. Hours after the talks ended, the U.S. State Department announced new sanctions on 14 shadow fleets involved in transporting Iranian oil and penalized 15 entities and two individuals. The Treasury Department viewed the action as part of the government’s “maximum pressure” campaign. Whether pre-planned or timed to take effect, the message is clear: Washington intends to negotiate and squeeze simultaneously.

For Tehran, which has pressed for sanctions relief as a starting point for progress, the sequence confirmed exactly the pattern it had feared. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi made this dynamic clear, telling Iranian state television that “the distrust that has developed is a serious challenge for negotiations.”

What happened in Muscat

Beneath the competing narratives, the outlines of a substantive discussion are already beginning to emerge. Iran reportedly rejected the U.S. demand for “zero enrichment,” an extreme position it would never have accepted at the first meeting. The two sides instead discussed diluting Iran’s existing uranium stockpile, a more technical and potentially more productive path.

At the same time, Al Jazeera reported that diplomats from Egypt, Turkey and Qatar each proposed a framework proposal to Iran: stop enriching uranium within three years, transfer highly enriched uranium out of the country, and commit to not launching ballistic missiles. Russia has reportedly expressed a willingness to receive uranium. Tehran has said stopping uranium enrichment and uranium transfers will not succeed.

Perhaps the most important development is the least obvious. Axios reported that Vitkov and Kushner met directly with Araghchi during the talks, breaking from the strictly indirect format Iran had demanded in most rounds of talks last year. Iran has previously insisted on communicating with the United States only through Omani intermediaries. Crossing this hurdle, even partially, demonstrates both parties’ recognition of the limitations of indirect negotiations once the bargaining becomes technical.

Oman’s framework is arguably the most honest assessment available today. Foreign Minister Badr Busaidi said the talks aimed to “create appropriate conditions for the resumption of diplomatic and technical negotiations.”

What will be decided in the coming weeks

Trump said a second round of talks would be held soon. Both sides told Axios that further meetings were expected within days. The compressed timeline is noteworthy. In last year’s tournament, each game was weeks apart. The pace suggests Washington believes the diplomatic window is shrinking, and Tehran is at least willing to test that claim.

Multiple tests will show whether urgency creates substance or is just speed.

First, there is the issue of scope. Fundamental disputes over the content of the talks remain unresolved. Iran won the first procedural battle: the venue of the meeting was moved from Türkiye to Oman, regional observers were excluded, and Araghchi claimed that only nuclear issues were discussed. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said before the talks that the agenda needs to include “all these issues.” If the second round begins with the same range battle, it will show that even the basic issues remain unresolved.

Secondly, Iran’s enrichment posture. Ahead of the June 2025 war, Iran has been enriching uranium to 60% purity, just steps away from weapons grade. Tehran said uranium enrichment activities had been halted following the attack. But Iran has also used new inspection arrangements to limit International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of bombed sites, raising concerns among nonproliferation experts. Instead, reports of a resumption or acceleration of enrichment activities could end the diplomatic track.

The third is the military environment. The U.S. naval buildup in the Arabian Sea is not cosmetic. The shooting down of a drone near the USS Abraham Lincoln and Iran’s attempt to intercept a U.S.-flagged ship in the Strait of Hormuz in the days leading up to the talks showed how quickly signals could slip into miscalculation. Whether the carrier strike group is strengthened, maintained or tapered in the coming weeks will reveal more about Washington’s assessment of diplomacy than any press statement.

The fourth is the rhythm of sanctions. The Shadow Fleet sanctions announced the same day set a pattern. If Washington continues to impose new economic penalties between rounds of negotiations, Tehran will see it as evidence that diplomacy is about performance, not process.

Fifth, behind-the-scenes channel activities. The most important diplomacy of the coming weeks may not take place in formal settings. Oman, Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye have been working behind the scenes to maintain dialogue. If these intermediate contacts remain active, room for demotion remains. If they remain silent, the margin for error shrinks.

Controlled deadlock is not a strategy

The most likely short-term outcome is neither a breakthrough nor a war, but a managed stalemate, with both sides maintaining maximum public positions while avoiding steps that might make future negotiations impossible. In reality, this is a pause maintained out of caution rather than a resolution based on confidence.

For the wider region, this distinction is urgent. The Gulf states have no intention of becoming an arena for escalation. Public statements from the region have consistently emphasized de-escalation, restraint and conflict avoidance. But regional actors can promote, host and encourage; they cannot impose conditions on Washington or Tehran.

The Muscat talks did not fail. They didn’t succeed either. They determined that a channel existed, that both parties were willing to use it, and that direct contact between senior officials was possible.

But channels are not plans. No war does not mean there is an agreement. The period between Muscat and what happened next was a period in which miscalculations remained close to the surface, and could only be sustained assuming that both sides read each other’s signals correctly.

There will be no agreement in the next round of negotiations. But it could indicate whether the two sides are building a floor beneath the standoff, or simply delaying the moment when that floor gives way.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera.